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Abstract 
This paper ultimately aims to test the sustainability of public debt in ten African economies. 
To accomplish this, the paper estimates the inter-temporal budget constraint model (IBC) by 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and measures the indicators of sustainability. 
Sustainability tests are carried out and show that, despite rising debt ratios, there is empirical 
evidence for Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa that public debt is sustainable and both the 
primary gap and tax gap indicators with a sharp rise in the debt ratios are shown to be 
worsening from one country to another and indicating increasingly possible unsustainable 
fiscal policies. It implies that the current primary deficit is too large and current taxes are too 
low to stabilize the debt ratio. Moreover we test Bohn’s fiscal rule, by analysing how the 
primary surplus to GDP reacts to variations in the debt to GDP ratio and the results point to 
the possibility of sustainable budgetary paths in Algeria, Ghana, Rwanda and South Africa, 
independent of whether remittances and foreign direct investments (FDI) variables are added 
in the model. 
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Chapter 1 Testing Fiscal Sustainability of African Economies 
1. Introduction 
  
This paper measures the sustainability of fiscal policy in African economies. Chronic public 
deficits as well as growing debt levels have received the attention of both researchers and 
policy makers because of their potential to destabilize economies. According to Gupta et al. 
(2002), fiscal policies have far-reaching impacts on economic growth and human capital 
investments. Corsetti and Roubinni (1991) also believe that if inter-temporal budget 
constraints are not supported by empirical evidence, changes in policy or macroeconomics 
variables such as growth, inflation, and interest rates will occur at some moment in the future. 
 
For developing countries, the debt burden on governments has remarkably increased since the 
1970s world oil crisis.  However, in 1996 (IMF, 1996), the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) Initiative was launched to address debt problems and poverty reduction in some of 
the world’s poorest countries. But the initiative failed as African countries still account for 
more than 80 % of the HIPC Initiative. In particular, African countries are not only 
vulnerable to debt crises due to their heavy dependence on raw materials as exporting goods, 
but also due to the fact that most of their debt is held by foreign donors in foreign currencies, 
a situation that leads  to highs level of debt service Sindzingre (2012). 
 
This paper is motivated first of all by the fact that most of the existing empirical studies on 
fiscal sustainability are focused on the USA and other industrial economies. Literature on 
African economies in this regard is thus largely limited to studies by the following – Issler 
and Lima (2000), Bravo and Silvestre (2002), Koo (2002), Claeys (2007), Arghyrou and 
Luintel (2007), Bajo- Rubio et al. (2008) and Melecky (2012). Secondly, there is no 
consensus among economists about the correct criteria for public finance sustainability; 
rather, each approach introduces its own to assess fiscal sustainability with definitions that 
are often similar across the different approaches. Thirdly, the paper focuses on the African 
region, which according to Sobhee (2010), experiences a very low growth performance and 
huge public sector deficits that are compounded by extremely high levels of indebtedness 
which in turn renders economies in this region more vulnerable to external shocks than other 
regions. 
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The contribution of this paper to existing literature is three-fold. Firstly, following Bravo and 
Silvestre (2002) and Koo (2002), it explores fiscal policy sustainability in Africa and 
developing countries in general. Secondly, it focuses on the region whose public policy has 
been at the heart of international investors’ concerns and stabilization programs, but whose 
public debt sustainability has remained largely unexplored and most vulnerable to public debt 
and chronic budget deficits than other economies. Thirdly, it introduces foreign direct 
investments (FDI) and remittances as new macro-variables in the models that affect public 
debt and budget deficits in the African context and measures their empirical importance in 
reducing and sustaining public debt.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The section 2 reviews the dominant literature related to 
fiscal sustainability while the section 3 presents the theoretical framework. This is followed 
by section 4 which presents the data used, a discussion of the methodology adopted as well as 
of the empirical results obtained. The last section provides a summary and conclusions along 
with discussions of certain policy implications that this chapter brings to the fore. 
2.  Review of the literature  
 
The literature on measuring fiscal sustainability proposes two methods in practice: Inter-
temporal Budget Constraint (IBC) by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and indicators of 
sustainability developed by Buiter (1985) and modified by Blanchard (1990). The indicators 
presented in the literature are either simple measures, mainly based on current information, or 
summary values of model-based projections of future paths of fiscal policy. The other method 
that use testing techniques so far, involve stationarity and co-integration analysis (Hamilton 
and Flavin, 1986; Wilcox, 1989; Trehan and Walsh, 1988).  
By applying the IBC method, which is based on inter-temporal budget constraint (IBC), 
which relies on the work of Hamilton and Flavin (1986). The method adopts a statistical test 
to determine whether the inter-temporal budget constraint holds for the empirical data. 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) show that if the primary deficit and/or the government debt 
follows a stationary process, then inter-temporal budget balances are satisfied and so fiscal 
policy becomes sustainable long-run government solvency. In addition, Chen (2014) 
conducted tests for fiscal sustainability in G7 and other European countries and finds four of 
them fiscally sustainable after taking into account the non-linear trend in the long run. 
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The second method is built on indicators of sustainability (i.e. the tax gap and primary gap), 
Blanchard et al. (1990) find that most OECD countries have sustainable policies in place in 
the medium-term. Buiter and Patel (1992) have applied this method in their analysis of the 
Indian economy and find that the country’s fiscal policy is unsustainable. Adopting a similar 
approach, Buiter et al. (1993) and Roubini (1995) ascertained that most OECD countries 
operate sustainable fiscal policies.  Koo (2002) has also applied the primary gap and tax gap 
indicators to an analysis of to the Korean economy. His findings are that the indicators have 
worsened since 1997, thus resulting in corresponding to a sharp rise of the debt-GDP ratio.  
He concludes that the current primary deficit is too large and that current taxes are too low to 
stabilize the debt ratio.  
 
The literature on African economies is still limited. On the basis of debt-to-export ratio, 
Cohen (1996) estimates the value of the debt of African economies and concludes that they 
are fiscally unsustainable. Fincke and Greiner (2010), applying Bohn’s method to some 
African and Latin American countries, reveal that despite rising debt ratios, there is evidence 
of sustainability for some of these economies. A similar study by Fedelino and Kudina (2003) 
on African HIPC finds that debt levels will remain unsustainable despite the HIPC Initiative. 
African economies are fiscally vulnerable due to dependence on raw materials and debts held 
in foreign currency. Several studies suggest that through several means  such as foreign direct 
investment (FDI), remittances, foreign aid, realistic exchange rates (appreciation) and exports 
diversification and growth, government debts can be remedied  and fiscal balances sustained 
so long as proper policies are in place (see Avramovic, 1991; Helleiner, 1992; Poirine, 1997; 
Ferrarini, 2008; Powell and Graham, 2010 and Sindizingre, 2012). From the economic point 
of view, the important questions in this regard are:  
 
 Are African countries fiscally sustainable? 
 Can Bohn’s fiscal rule generate evidence of corrective fiscal actions in response to an 
increasing debt to GDP ratio? 
3.  Theoretical framework 
 
The Inter-temporal Budget Constraint (IBC) method for measuring fiscal sustainability uses 
econometric tests of stationarity of government debt and a co-integration relationship 
between debt and primary balance. Based on previous studies (see Ahmed and Rogers, 1995; 
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Bravo and Sylvestre, 2002; Bohn, 2007; Arghyrou and Luintel, 2007; and Polito and 
Wickens, 2012), derivation of the inter-temporal budget constraint (IBC) starts with a simple 
version one-period government budget constraint: 
 
𝐵𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟)𝐵𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡+1                                                       (1)  
where 𝐵𝑡 is the stock of public debt, 𝐺𝑡 is the government expenditures net of interests, 𝑇𝑡 is 
the tax revenues, 𝑟 is the interest rate on government debt assumed fixed and 𝑆𝑡 the primary 
surplus.  
Solving equation (1) recursively forwards in time gives: 
𝐵𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟)
−1𝑆𝑡+1 +  (1 + 𝑟)
−1𝐵𝑡+1                                                                             (2)  
𝐵𝑡 =  (1 + 𝑟)
−2𝑆𝑡+2 + (1 + 𝑟)
−1𝑆𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟)
−2𝐵𝑡+2                                                 (3)  
                             … 
𝐵𝑡 = ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
−𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑆𝑡+𝑖 +  (1 + 𝑟)
−𝑛𝐵𝑡+𝑛                                                                     (4)  
Taking the limit as n tends to infinity: 
𝐵𝑡 =  ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
−𝑖∞
𝑖=1 𝑆𝑡+𝑖 + lim𝑛→∞ 𝐸𝑡  (1 + 𝑟)
−𝑛𝐵𝑡+𝑛                                                (5)   
The assumption behind the IBC is that that the second term giving the present value of the 
government debt in infinity is assumed to be zero: 
 
lim𝑛→∞(1 + 𝑟)
−𝑛 𝐵𝑡+𝑛 = 0                                                                                                 (6)  
This assumption is called the transversality condition (TC) or no-Ponzi game condition 
(NPG). By substituting it to the above equation, the IBC is obtained as follows:  
 
𝐵𝑡 = ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
−𝑖∞
𝑖=1 𝑆𝑡+1                                                                                                       (7)  
The IBC method requires that the limit term (Eq. 6) be equal to zero asymptotically. Thus the 
government cannot leave a debt that has a positive expected present value in the limit; that 
would imply resorting to Ponzi games. The inter-temporal budget constraint reveals that the 
present value of the flow of primary balances must equal the present stock of net debt. This 
means that government’s total net liability must be equal to its total assets (flow of primary 
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balances). The transversality condition is sometimes called the no-Ponzi game condition 
meaning that government is not allowed to organise or finance Ponzi games.  
 
A Ponzi game or scheme is a system in which returns to the principal of previous investors is 
paid by new investments made by subsequent investors. In the case of debt, a debtor is 
deemed to be running a Ponzi game at the expense of creditors when the debtor always pays 
the interest by issuing more debt. The appropriate sustainability test is then administered to 
ascertain if the historical process that generates fiscal data is likely to result in the IBC 
eventually being violated (Chalk and Hemming, 2000). If so, fiscal policy is not sustainable 
and the data generating process will have to be changed; current policy is then regarded as 
unsustainable. Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Wilcox (1989) have modified the IBC test and 
proven that a stationary quasi-difference of primary deficit 𝐷𝑡 − 𝜑. 𝐷𝑡~𝐼(0) is sufficient for 
the transversality condition to hold, if and only if debt and primary deficit are co-integrated 
(𝐷𝑡 , 𝐵𝑡−1). 
 
From eq. (1), let us assume the interest rate constant and can be written as follows: 
𝐵𝑡+1 = 𝐺𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                     (8)  
 
This implies the following: 
 
𝐵𝑡+1 − 𝐵𝑡 = 𝐺𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡                                                                                                    (9)  
According to Issler and Lima (2000), Claeys (2007) and Bohn (2007), a typical co-integrating 
regression for estimation is as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑡 = −𝛼𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                  (10)  
With 𝛼 > 0, where 𝐷𝑡 is the primary deficit. 
 
The second modification of the IBC method is provided by Trehan and Walsh (1991), Hakkio 
and Rush (1991) and Haug (1991). This model assumes stochastic real interest rates and 
demonstrates that a co-integrating relation between government tax revenue and expenditure 
is a necessary condition for the IBC to hold. For empirical purposes, and on the assumption 
that the interest rate is stationary, Eq. (2) can be rewritten as follows: 
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𝑆𝑡 = 𝐺𝐺𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡 = ∑ 𝛿
𝑗−1∞
𝑗=1 (∆𝑇𝑡+𝑗 − ∆𝐺𝐺𝑡+𝑗 + 𝑟∆𝐵𝑡+𝑗−1 )                                       (11)  
where 𝐺𝐺𝑡 =  𝐺𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡𝐵𝑡−1 is the total government expenditures inclusive of interest payments 
on the debt outstanding with discount factor 𝛿 = (1 + 𝑟)−1  and ∆ is the first difference 
operator. Given that the variables 𝐺𝐺𝑡 and 𝑇𝑡 are usually non-stationary, this equation 
provides a statistical framework for testing sustainability. Indeed, fiscal sustainability implies 
that tax revenues and expenditures must be co-integrated if 𝐺𝐺𝑡 and 𝑇𝑡 are I (/.1) process.  In 
line with Bajo-Rubio et. al’s (2010) and Escario et. al’s (2012), the equation to estimate takes 
the following form: 
𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐺𝐺𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                (12)  
The second method is based on indicators of the sustainability of fiscal policy along the lines 
suggested by Buiter (1985) and Blanchard (1990). Chouraqui et al. (1990), Chalk and 
Hemming (2000) and Koo (2002) argue that the indicators of sustainability assess the 
magnitude of inconsistencies in fiscal policies and measure the size of the permanent fiscal 
adjustment needed to achieve stabilization of the base year national debt-to-GDP ratio. 
According to Buiter (1985), sustainable fiscal policy should maintain the ratio of government 
net worth to output at its current level. He then calculates the constant primary deficit 
necessary to achieve this objective. This is given by: 
𝑑𝑡
∗ = (𝑟𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡)𝑤𝑡                                                                                                                      (13)                                                                                                                        
where 𝑑𝑡
∗  is the ratio of constant primary deficit to GDP, 𝑟𝑡 the interest rate, 𝑛𝑡 the growth 
rate of the economy, 𝑤𝑡 =
𝑊𝑡
𝑌𝑡
 the ratio of net worth to GDP.  
 
Then the sustainability indicator introduced by Buiter (1985) is:   
𝐺𝑡
𝑛𝑤 = 𝑑𝑡
∗ − 𝑑𝑡 = (𝑟𝑡 − 𝑛𝑡)𝑤𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡                                                                                     (14)  
where 𝑑𝑡 =
𝐷𝑡
𝑌𝑡
 is the ratio of current primary deficit to GDP. A negative value for this 
indicator suggests that the current primary deficit is too large to stabilize the net worth ratio 
and that fiscal policy should thus be regarded as unsustainable. Even if the net worth 
indicator is easy to interpret, it is difficult in general to obtain accurate information on the 
magnitude of government net worth. Easily measurable indicators of fiscal sustainability are 
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therefore developed by Blanchard (1990) - the primary gap and the tax gap indicators of 
sustainability. 
 
The primary gap indicator is based on the permanent primary deficit necessary to stabilize the 
debt ratio and is given by: 
𝑑𝑡
∗ = (𝑛𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡)𝑏𝑡                                                                                                                       (15)  
where 𝑏𝑡 =
𝐵𝑡
𝑌𝑡
 is the ratio of government debt to GDP. The primary gap indicator is then  
𝐺𝑡
𝑃 = 𝑑𝑡
∗ − 𝑑𝑡 = (𝑛𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡)𝑏𝑡 − 𝑑𝑡                                                                                        (16)  
This measures the required adjustment in the primary deficit needed to stabilize the 
government debt-to-GDP ratio, given the current and projected paths of the primary balance, 
the real interest rate and output growth as noted by Horne (1991). The primary gap indicator 
equals the difference between the permanent primary deficits ratio that stabilizes the 
outstanding debt-to-GDP ratio and the current primary fiscal deficit. The benchmark indicator 
is zero, with a negative value implying that the current primary deficit is too large to stabilize 
the debt ratio and that fiscal policy is unsustainable. 
 
Another indicator of fiscal sustainability, according to Blanchard (1990), is the tax gap 
indicator and is based on the permanent tax to output ratio necessary to stabilize the debt 
ratio. This is given by:  
 𝑡𝑡
∗ = 𝑔𝑡 − (𝑛𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡)𝑏𝑡                                                                                                             (17) 
where 𝑡𝑡
∗  is the ratio of constant taxes to GDP, 𝑔𝑡 the ratio of primary government 
expenditures (excluding interest payments) to GDP. Then the tax gap indicator is  
𝐺𝑡
𝑇 = 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡
∗ = 𝑡𝑡 + (𝑛𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡)𝑏𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡                                                                                 (18)  
where 𝑡𝑡 is the ratio of taxes to GDP. The tax gap indicator is the difference between the 
current tax ratio and the constant tax ratio to GDP. It measures the required adjustment in the 
tax ratio needed to stabilize the outstanding debt-to-GDP ratio, given the current and 
projected paths of the primary expenditures, the real interest rate and output growth. A 
negative value for the tax gap indicator suggests that the current taxes are too low to stabilize 
the debt ratio given the current fiscal policy.  Thus the fiscal policy is deemed unsustainable. 
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4.     Empirical analysis  
4.1    Data description and econometric techniques  
 
The data used in this paper is obtained from the International Financial Statistics, Economist 
Intelligence Unit, UNCTAD and the World Bank annual database and covers the period from 
1970 to 2012. The ten countries that are considered herein are Algeria (ALG), Ivory Coast 
(CIV), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Nigeria (NIG), Rwanda (RWA), South Africa (SA), 
Tanzania (TZ), Tunis (TUN) and Zambia (ZAM). According to 2010 GNI per capita 
classification, determined by the World Bank Atlas Method (World Bank, 2010), Algeria, 
Tunisia and South Africa are classified as upper middle income countries; Ghana, Ivory 
Coast Nigeria and Zambia are classified as lower middle income countries and Kenya, 
Tanzania and Rwanda belong to the low income countries. The consumer price index (CPI) is 
used to deflate nominal series. Specific techniques have been applied to each of the methods 
used in this paper. For the IBC method, empirical techniques used are the unit-root proposed 
by Dickey and Fuller (1979) and the co-integration test devised by Engle and Granger (1987). 
The approach adopted in this paper is similar to the one followed by Payne (1997) in his 
analysis of the G7 countries and that by Bravo and Sylvestre’s (2002) study of European 
countries. The indicators of sustainability, tax gap and primary gap are calculated using the 
formula in Eviews 7 statistical package. Total public debt is defined as the sum of the 
domestic debt and the foreign debt. Table 1 summarizes the variables used in both models. 
Table 1: Data description 
Variable Description 
𝐵𝑡  
𝐺𝑡  
𝑇𝑡  
𝑆𝑡  
𝐷𝑡  
𝑟𝑡  
𝐺𝐺𝑡  
𝑑𝑡
∗  
𝑑𝑡  
𝑛𝑡  
𝑏𝑡   
𝑡𝑡
∗  
𝑔𝑡  
𝑡𝑡 
Stock of total public debt 
Government expenditure 
Tax revenues 
Primary Surplus 
Primary Deficit 
Interest rate on government debt 
Government expenditure inclusive of interests payment 
Ratio of constant primary deficit to GDP 
Ratio of current primary deficit to GDP 
Growth rate of the economy 
Ratio of government debt to GDP 
Ratio of constant taxes to GDP 
Ratio of primary government expenditures (excluding interests payment) to GDP 
Ratio of taxes to GDP 
14 
 
 
4.2.     Indicators of sustainability results (5 year averages) 
Table 2: Primary gap and tax gap results (Eq. 16 and eq. 18) 
Countries ALG   CIV   GHA   KEN   NIG   
Indicators PG TG PG TG PG TG PG TG PG TG 
1970 -0.48 -8.60 4.71 -1.84 -5.67 25.01 0.16 25.01 2.11 -3.76 
1975 6.09 22.11 -7.56 -5.00 13.38 -5.23 0.31 -5.23 -10.60 7.27 
1980 0.41 9.48 3.64 -3.00 8.98 4.20 0.66 4.20 5.48 2.44 
1985 4.57 0.52 6.33 3.50 -8.37 9.70 1.34 9.70 -6.98 7.03 
1990 5.69 -3.30 4.03 9.50 -9.87 8.20 -3.93 8.20 22.05 -19.01 
1995 16.73 5.64 -6.58 -5.00 -9.44 2.50 7.41 2.50 6.91 5.69 
2000 1.58 9.63 1.59 3.75 -7.18 5.40 8.22 5.40 8.22 7.16 
2005 -2.60 -2.33 2.98 4.00 -10.00 5.40 10.00 -5.40 3.37 10.00 
2010 -6.51 8.24 3.68 -12.03 -12.39 7.82 6.43 7.82 7.09 -14.82 
2012 -2.94 -8.32 -7.09 5.88 -9.67 9.56 2.67 -8.09 -10.01 16.92 
 
Countries RWA   SA   TUN   TZ   ZAM   
Indicators PG TG PG TG PG TG PG TG PG TG 
1970 0.48 8.60 -4.71 11.84 5.67 25.01 0.16 -5.01 2.11 3.76 
1975 6.09 -2.11 7.56 -6.00 -7.38 -5.23 -0.31 -5.23 -10.60 7.27 
1980 0.41 9.48 3.64 3.00 8.98 4.20 0.66 4.20 15.48 -2.44 
1985 -4.57 0.52 6.33 3.50 -8.37 9.70 -1.34 9.70 -6.98 -7.03 
1990 -5.69 -23.30 4.03 9.50 9.87 8.20 3.93 8.20 2.05 9.01 
1995 16.73 5.64 -6.58 -5.00 9.44 -2.50 7.41 2.50 6.91 -5.69 
2000 -1.58 -9.63 1.59 3.75 -7.18 5.40 -18.22 -5.40 8.22 2.16 
2005 2.60 -5.33 -2.98 -2.00 -10.00 5.40 -10.00 5.40 -3.37 -1.00 
2010 -6.51 -8.24 3.68 -12.03 12.39 7.82 10.43 -7.82 -9.09 4.82 
2012 -2.94 -8.32 -7.09 1.88 9.67 9.56 -11.67 -8.09 -5.01 -6.92 
PG and TG stand for Primary gap and Tax Gap indicators and the unit is the percentage 
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4.3.    Stationarity and Co-integration tests results 
 
Table 3: Augmented Dickey- Fuller test on government deficit/ surplus and debt (Eq.7) 
Country -   bt     st/dt  Δbt   Δst/dt 
ALG ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-2.093  
0 
0.666                            
-2.223         
2 
0.159           
-3.953       
1 
0.000        
-4.372 
0 
0.000    
CIV ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-2.192              
0 
0.308                
-3.510         
1 
0.452           
-5.278        
0 
0.003         
-5.912 
0 
0.001 
GHA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-1.299               
3 
0.609               
-3.411          
2 
0.419          
-3.973       
0 
0.001         
-5.781 
0 
0.000 
KEN ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-1.342                
2 
0.034                
-2.326        
1 
0.602          
-4.363       
0 
0.080         
-4.989 
0 
0.000 
NIG ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-1.009               
1 
0.443                
-2.936         
3 
0.367         
-4.973        
1 
0.012          
-6.398 
0 
0.000 
RWA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-1.982                
1 
0.510                
-2.911         
3 
0.491          
-4.201        
2 
0.000          
-3.321 
2 
0.004 
SA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-1.272               
3 
0.623                
-2.229         
1 
0.350          
-4.728         
2 
0.003           
-5.529              
0 
0.000 
TUN ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-2.883               
1 
0.448                 
-3.727        
1 
0.720          
-4.321          
1 
0.000          
-5.527 
0 
0.000 
TZ ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-1.102              
2 
0.346                
-2.743         
3 
0.218           
-3.602          
1 
0.008         
-4.419 
1 
0.000 
ZAM ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-1.509              
1 
0.312                
-3.234         
0 
0.342           
-3.991         
0 
0.020         
-5.234 
1 
0.002 
Note: bt: ratio of debt to GDP; st/dt: ratio of budget deficit or surplus to GDP. These series are 
I (0) after applying the Phillips and Perron (1988) test. 
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Table 4: Results from Engle- Granger Co-integration test on budget deficit and debt (Eq.10) 
Country - Dependent Variable 
dt                                bt            
Co-integration 
ALG ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-1.980 
3 
0.529 
2.820 
-2.812 
3 
0.671 
1.823 
No 
CIV ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-3.248 
1 
0.777 
1.738 
-2.832 
1 
0.921 
3.129 
No 
GHA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-3.492 
2 
0.008 
1.189 
-2.812 
2 
0.002 
1.944 
Yes 
KEN ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-4.221 
0 
0.672 
5.231 
-1.299 
0 
0.288 
8.231 
No 
NIG ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-2.001 
0 
0.065 
1.998 
-4.301 
0 
0.086 
0.823 
Yes 
RWA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-3.339 
0 
0.794 
1.897 
-5.321 
0 
0.880 
2.931 
No 
SA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-1.673 
0 
0.004 
1.490 
-0.823 
0 
0.003 
2.300 
Yes 
TUN ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-4.215 
2 
0.005 
1.922 
-3.129 
2 
0.030 
0.766 
Yes 
TZ ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-3.334 
1 
0.225 
3.955 
-2.301 
1 
0.671 
1.999 
No 
ZAM ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
6.291 
0 
0.673 
2.101 
7.289 
0 
0.712 
1.991 
No 
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Table 5: Augmented Dickey- Fuller test on government expenditures and revenues (Eq.12) 
Country -   gg     t  Δgg   Δt 
ALG ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-6.231 
5 
0.332 
-3.183 
2 
0.190 
-5.282 
4 
0.001 
-7.283 
2 
0.000 
CIV ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-4.102 
1 
0.412 
-4.902 
7 
0.090 
-6.702 
3 
0.001 
-7.281 
0 
0.002 
GHA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-2.123 
1 
0.407 
-4.893 
1 
0.202 
-6.231 
1 
0.001 
-3.218 
1 
0.000 
KEN ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-3.372 
3 
0.001 
-2.982 
2 
0.288 
-5.983 
4 
0.003 
-5.321 
0 
0.000 
NIG ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-1.290 
3 
0.065 
-2.901 
1 
0.519 
-4.230 
1 
0.004 
-6.367 
4 
0.000 
RWA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-2.314 
3 
0.013 
-3.410 
2 
0.231 
-4.325 
1 
0.000 
-5.736 
0 
0.000 
SA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-1.991 
1 
0.012 
-2.120 
4 
0.004 
-5.231 
5 
0.000 
-5.923 
0 
0.000 
TUN ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-3.126 
3 
0.238 
-2.100 
2 
0.349 
-3.719 
1 
0.001 
-6.231 
0 
0.000 
TZ ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-2.213 
5 
0.623 
-3.832 
1 
0.278 
-6.329 
1 
0.401 
-4.063 
2 
0.001 
ZAM ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
-3.672 
6 
0.982 
-3.901 
1 
0.801 
-6.201 
1 
0.000 
-9.312 
0 
0.000 
Note: ggt and tt are government expenditures inclusive of interests and tax revenues ratios to 
GDP. Applying the Phillips and Perron (1988) test, these series are also I (0). 
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Table 6: Results from Engle-Granger co-integration test on government expenditures and 
revenues (Eq.12) 
Country - Dependent Variable 
ggt                                tt            
Co-integration 
ALG ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-4.945 
1 
0.531 
1.811 
-1.002 
1 
0.271 
2.723 
No 
CIV ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-3.998 
3 
0.667 
1.003 
-1.202 
3 
0.425 
3.129 
No 
GHA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-1.402 
0 
0.008 
2.189 
-5.008 
0 
0.002 
0.944 
Yes 
KEN ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-4.221 
0 
0.832 
3.301 
-1.299 
0 
0.638 
1.761 
No 
NIG ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-1.001 
0 
0.885 
0.998 
-2.601 
0 
0.392 
0.663 
No 
RWA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-1.639 
0 
0.766 
0.806 
-5.099 
0 
0.809 
1.821 
No 
SA ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-1.433 
1 
0.002 
3.475 
-0.339 
1 
0.008 
2.493 
Yes 
TUN ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-3.110 
1 
0.899 
1.362 
-6.639 
1 
0.182 
0.177 
No 
TZ ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
-3.001 
3 
0.055 
3.332 
-1.701 
3 
0.061 
0.421 
Yes(10%) 
No (5%) 
ZAM ADF 
Lags 
P-value 
Coefficient of independent variable 
7.638 
0 
0.544 
4.101 
7.012 
0 
0.771 
1.531 
No 
 
Annual data for 1970-2012 is used to test whether the selected African economies are fiscally 
sustainable. The results from Table 2 are indicators of sustainability. In general, they show 
that fiscal policies are not sustainable in Africa. The results also show that the situation varies 
between economies due to the different fiscal policies of different countries. This implies that 
current primary deficits are too large and that current taxes are too low to stabilize the debt 
ratios of these economies.  
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Table 3 results are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test for debt and budget deficits. 
The results reveal that the ratios of debt and budget deficits may be considered integrated of 
order 1 (I (1)) in all the countries under consideration. The Engle-Granger test is then 
administered for eq. (10) that sums up the results in Table 4. This ascertains the coefficients 
of the independent variable for each country. Co-integration is not rejected at the level of 5% 
significance for Ghana, South Africa and Tunisia.  However if   the 10% significance level is 
considered, co-integration is also not rejected for Nigeria. Table 5 results also show that the 
variables ratio of government expenditures and revenues are all integrated of order 1. From 
Table 5, the Engle–Granger co-integration test was run and it revealed in Table 6 that only 
Ghana, South Africa and Tanzania are fiscally sustainable.  
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the fiscal sustainability of African economies has been tested by applying 
different extensions of the IBC method and indicators of sustainability. In line with previous 
studies, the results depend on the type of test and sample used. The results for indicators of 
fiscal sustainability in this study have shown that in general, fiscal policy in Africa is not 
sustainable, and that its degree of unsustainability differs from one country to another due to 
differences in fiscal policies. This means that the current primary deficit is too large and 
current taxes are too low to stabilize the debt ratio. Thus, increased tax collection and per 
capita tax burdens are recommended to reduce the budget deficits and debts of respective 
governments and to consolidate their individual fiscal stance. In addition, the co-integration 
test was carried out on debt and budget deficit series and show that only Ghana, Nigeria, 
South Africa and Tunisia follow a sustainable fiscal policy path. The same test was applied to 
tax revenues and government expenditure ratios and shows that Ghana, South Africa and 
Tanzania are fiscally sustainable. These findings agree with previous other studies. 
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Chapter 2  Estimating fiscal reaction functions of African Economies 
1. Introduction  
 
This paper estimates Bohn’s fiscal rule or fiscal reaction function for African economies by 
analysing how African governments react to changes in their debt positions. To accomplish 
this, the paper estimates a fiscal reaction function using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
method. The purpose of this paper is to assess the quantitative scale of adjustment of the 
primary balance to the debt obligations of African countries. Africa’s debt burden has long 
been of key concern to the international community. Since 2000, the Enhanced HIPC 
Initiative has delivered far more debt relief to Africa. Nevertheless, according to Fedelino and 
Kudina (2003), the sustainability of the public debt of African countries remains highly 
precarious, if not illusory. 
Africa’s debt is the highest in the world. As a proportion of GDP, according to IMF (1999), 
some countries in the region spend more than half of their export earnings to service foreign 
debts. The debts of many African countries are so large in relation to their foreign exchange 
earnings potential that it would be impossible to pay them off, even if growth resumes and is 
sustained at unrealistically high levels. Several factors are responsible for this situation. 
According to Mistry (2008), the African debt crisis arose due to (1) over-borrowing by 
developing countries and reckless lending by international commercial banks in the 1970s; 
(2) the collapse of world commodity prices (especially petroleum) in the early 1980s; and (3) 
the sharp increase in international interest (lending) rates in 1982. 
The credibility of a government is extremely important for its ability to borrow both 
domestically and internationally. The debt crisis in Africa has put renewed emphasis on the 
sustainability and prudence of fiscal policies. Issues pertaining to debt, aid delivery and 
management, and sustainability, remain central to discourses on national, regional and global 
development. Most African nations have millions of their people living in poverty, partly 
because of increasing debts and the burden of repayment. These repayments have been to the 
detriment of spending on key sectors and programmes for the social and economic 
advancement of such nations. Fiscal reaction functions are estimated to help relevant 
authorities to adjust their activities following certain rules.  
The paper is motivated first by the fact that most empirical studies have been conducted only 
in developed and emerging economies, thus the literature on Africa is very limited. Some of 
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the better-known studies in this regard include those by Bohn (1998, 2005), De Mello (2005), 
David and Leeper (2006), Budina and Wijnbergen (2008), Burger et al. (2011), and Greiner 
et al. (2007, 2010, 2011).  Following the world oil price shocks in the 1970s, the international 
debt crisis and credit crunch as well as the crash of commodity prices in the early 1980s, the 
African region was seriously affected and became vulnerable due to its dependence on 
foreign economies as was seen during the recessions of the 1980s and 1990s. This paper is 
significant in that it focuses on the African region, which according to Sobhee (2010), has 
very low growth rates and huge public sector deficits that are compounded by extremely high 
levels of indebtedness and is more fragile than other regions in the face of external shocks. 
There are three contributions that the paper makes regarding estimating the fiscal responses 
of African economies. First, following Bohn (1998, 2005), Greiner and Kauermann (2007), 
Greiner et al. (2007) and Fincke and Greiner (2010), it estimates fiscal responses for African 
economies and explores their fiscal policy sustainability. Secondly, it focuses on the region 
whose public policy has been at the heart of international investors’ concerns and 
stabilization programmes but whose public debt sustainability has remained largely 
unexplored and is the most vulnerable among all the regions in the world to public debt and 
chronic budget deficits. Thirdly, the paper examines foreign direct investments (FDI), (see 
Schintzer, 2002), Ferrarini, 2008) and remittances (see Poirine, 1997, Abdih et al., 2009), as 
new macro-variables within models that affect public debt and budget deficits in African 
contexts. The paper also examines the empirical importance of these macro-variables in 
reducing and sustaining Africa’s public debt.  
The paper is structured as follows: The section to follow explores existing literature related to 
fiscal reaction functions while the next presents the theoretical framework of this discussion. 
This is followed by presentation of data and empirical results which leads to the summary 
and conclusion. 
2.  Literature review 
 
The fiscal reaction function is a fiscal rule that has been estimated by several scholars 
including Bohn (1998, 2005), De Mello (2005), Davig and Leeper (2006), Budina and 
Wijnbergen (2008), and Burger et al. (2011). Bohn’s (1998) fiscal rule is based on an analysis 
of how primary fiscal balance (excluding the interest payments on public debt) reacts to 
variations in sovereign debt caused by economic shocks. In such a framework, fiscal policy is 
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considered sustainable once the government reacts systematically to a change in public debt 
by adjusting the primary fiscal balance. This fiscal rule is based on Barro’s (1979) tax 
smoothing hypothesis which states that regular spending should be financed by taxes given 
that tax rates remain constant. 
In his estimation of regression of fiscal reaction for the US, Bohn (1998) finds a strong 
evidence of sustainability. Similar studies have been conducted in European countries by 
Gong et al. (2001) and Balabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2005), all of whom conclude that 
the fiscal policies of these countries are sustainable. Allen and Nankani (2004) have also 
applied Bohn’s rule to a sample of industrial and developing countries with results indicating 
that both industrial and developing countries with low debt ratios have similar sustainability 
indices. However the case is different for developing countries with a high debt ratio. For 
example, in their assessment of the sustainability and the feasibility of government debt in the 
Philippines , Qin et al. (2006) conclude that although  the debt is unsustainable, it may be 
weakly feasible if simple budgetary deficit control policies are implemented. 
Following a reassessment of Greiner and Semmler’s (1999) work, Greiner et al. (2007) 
demonstrate that primary surpluses respond positively to higher debt ratios, thus implying 
sustainable debts for Euro-area countries. Mendoza and Ostry (2008) use the same fiscal rule 
for emerging market economies and reveal that Bohn’s condition for fiscal solvency is 
consistent with the data for all emerging economies. However, using co-integration and 
multico-integration tests, Kia’s (2008) evaluation of the fiscal sustainability of Iran and 
Turkey demonstrates that the fiscal budgeting process in both countries is not sustainable. 
Fincke and Greiner (2011) have also applied this Bohn’s fiscal rule to their analysis of three 
industrialized economies - USA, Japan and Germany, where central banks are independent 
and budget deficits are not financed by money creation. Their findings show that although 
public debt in these countries are  sustainable, , there are certain country-specific features  of 
public finances that still need to be considered. In addition, Doi et al. (2011), Sakuragawa, 
Hosono (2011) and Chen (2014), following Bohn’s rule, have all found Japan’s fiscal policy 
to be sustainable. 
The literature on estimating fiscal reaction function of African economies is still limited as 
only a few studies have been conducted in the region. One of these is Fincke and Greiner 
(2010) study that applies Bohn’s rule to low and middle income developing countries in 
Africa and Latin-America. The results show that, despite rising debt ratios, there is empirical 
23 
 
evidence for some of the countries that public debt is sustainable, independent of whether 
they belong to the low-income or middle-income group of countries. Burger et al. (2012) 
have also conducted a similar study using  a fiscal reaction function for South Africa with 
results indicating that, since 1946, the South African government has ran a sustainable fiscal 
policy by reducing primary deficits or increasing surpluses in response to rising debt.  
 
African economies are more vulnerable to debt crises than other regions of the world. This is 
due to the heavy dependence on raw materials as exports, and the fact that debt is held in 
foreign currency, a situation that increases the cost of repayment. Some studies suggest that 
interventions like as foreign direct investment (FDI) and remittance flows may help in 
sustaining such chronic budget deficits. Following the views of Poirine (1997), Schintzer 
(2002), Ferrarini (2008), (1997), Abdih et al. (2009), this paper suggests that FDI and 
remittances can be considered as new macro-variables that can help in reducing and 
sustaining debt in the African context. 
3.   Methodology and framework 
 
A fiscal reaction function is a fiscal rule that helps governments forecast and prepares to 
respond to some macroeconomic changes. Having right fiscal reaction functions make fiscal 
policy and public finance sound and stable as has been demonstrated by Bohn (1998). The 
main hypothesis to be tested when estimating a fiscal reaction function relates to the ways in 
which a government adjusts primary budget balances, in response to changes in indebtedness 
so as to ensure the sustainability of debt dynamics over time. As Gali et al. (2003), Greiner et 
al. (2007), Greiner and Kauermann (2007) and Fincke and Greiner (2010) have shown, the 
fiscal reaction function originates from the government inter-temporal budget constraint and 
is as follows: 
𝐺𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡                                                                            (1)  
An alternative function is that used by Bohn (1998). If the interest rate r is assumed to be 
constant, the accumulation of the public debt can be described in continuous time by the 
equation below:  
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑟(𝑡)𝐵(𝑡) − 𝑆(𝑡)                                                                                      (2)  
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with 𝐺𝑡, government spending, 𝑇𝑡, tax revenues, 𝐵𝑡, total debt, 𝑟𝑡 real interest rate on debt and 
𝑆(𝑡) the real government surplus exclusive of interest payments on public debt. 
 
The meaning of equation (1) is that the government’s total receipts including tax (Tt) and 
borrowing (Bt) of the current period should equal the government’s total spending (Gt) plus 
debt service (including the principal from the previous period Bt-1 and interest payment rt-1Bt. 
Equation (2) represents a situation where  a government can be considered to be  following a 
sustainable debt policy given that the present value of public debt converges to zero 
asymptotically  so long as  a Ponzi game is not being played. Solving equation (2): 
 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝑒
∫ 𝑟(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
𝑡0 (𝐵(0) − ∫ 𝑒− ∫ 𝑟(𝜇)𝑑𝜇
𝑡
𝑡0
𝑡
𝑡0
𝑆(𝜏)𝑑𝜏)                                        (3)  
From eq. (3), it is assumed that the government determines the primary surplus to GDP ratio 
𝑠𝑡 such that it is a positive linear function of the debt to GDP ratio, 𝑏𝑡. Thus the following 
equation defines the primary surplus ratio: 
𝑠(𝑡) = 𝜌(𝑡)𝑏(𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                          (4)  
With 𝜌 being the coefficient that indicates how the changes in public debt to GDP ratio affect 
the primary surplus. It is defined as s(t ) =S(t ) /Y(t ) to be the government’s primary surplus 
to GDP ratio  that can be determined by any government. The debt to GDP ratio is described 
as b(t ) = B(t )/Y (t ) , in which case, the primary surplus to GDP ratio is a positive linear 
function of the debt to GDP ratio.  𝜀𝑡, is a stochastic error term (Bohn, 1998). The empirical 
analysis is based on Barro’s (1979) tax-smoothing model (see also Canzoneri et al. 2001). The 
result is that optimal taxes should be constant over time. With constant tax, the primary surplus is 
used as a counterweight to the impact of fluctuation in government revenues and expenditures.  
 
Using equation (4), the evolution of public debt can be written in the form of the following 
differential equation (see Kloeden and Platen, 1995): 
𝑑𝐵(𝑡) = (𝑟(𝑡) − 𝜌(𝑡))𝐵𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝑎1(𝑡)𝑑𝑊𝑡                                                        (5)  
Here, Wt is a Wiener process (Wt ~N(0,1)), t ≥ 0, and 𝑎1(𝑡) is the diffusion. Solving eq. (5) 
and multiplying both sides by 𝑒− ∫ 𝑟(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
𝑡0  to get the present value of public debt yields: 
𝑒− ∫ 𝑟(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
𝑡0 𝐵𝑡 = 𝑒
−𝜌𝑡 (𝐵𝑡0 + ∫ 𝑒
𝜌𝑡−∫ 𝑟(𝜏)𝑑𝜇
𝑡
𝑡0
𝑡
𝑡0
𝑎1(𝜏)𝑑𝑊𝜏)                           (6)  
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At time t=t0, public debt 𝐵𝑡0 ≥ 0. And the sustainability holds if  
lim𝑡→∞ 𝑒
− ∫ 𝑟(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
𝑡0 𝐵𝑡 = 0                                                                                      (7)  
According to equation (5), if we expect the present value of public debt to converge to zero 
for t → ∞, 𝜌 must be positive. Otherwise if the 𝜌 is negative, the path of public debt will not 
be sustainable. Therefore, the estimations of coefficients provide important indicators of how 
the government deals with public debt. Furthermore, the sustainability of the path of the fiscal 
policy can also be determined thereby.  
 Assuming that the primary surplus to GDP ratio is a positive linear function of the debt to 
GDP ratio and of a constant term, the primary surplus-GDP ratio can be written as follows: 
𝑆(𝑡)
𝑌(𝑡)
= 𝛼 + 𝜌(𝑡)
𝐵(𝑡)
𝑌(𝑡)
                                                                                                (8)  
Where Y(t) denotes GDP at t and α, 𝜌(t)∈IR are coefficients with α being constant. 𝜌(𝑡) 
determines how strong the primary surplus reacts to changes in the public debt-GDP ratio and 
α can be interpreted as a systematic component determining how the level of the primary 
surplus reacts to a rise in GDP. α can also be seen as other constant variables that affect the 
primary surplus-GDP ratio.  
In light of eq. (8), describing the evolution of public debt, can be rewritten as: 
?̇?(𝑡) = 𝑟(𝑡)𝐵(𝑡) − 𝑆𝑡 = (𝑟(𝑡) − 𝜌(𝑡))𝐵(𝑡) − 𝛼𝑌𝑡                                          (9)  
Solving this differential eq. (9) to get the present value of the stock of debt yields:  
𝐵(𝑡) = (
𝛼
𝑟−𝛾−𝛽
) 𝑌(0)𝑒𝛾𝑡 + 𝑒(𝑟−𝛽)𝑡𝐶1                                                                 (10)  
with B(0)>0 debt at time 0 which is assumed to be strictly positive and 𝐶2 a constant  given 
by 𝐶2 = 𝐵(0) − 𝑌(0)𝛼/(𝑟 − 𝛾 − 𝛽). Given this expression, we can assume some conditions 
which must be fulfilled for the inter-temporal budget constraint of the government to hold.  
Assuming that in our model economy, the following turns out to hold true: 
For (i) 𝛽 > 0 the inter-temporal budget constraint of the government holds if 𝑟 > 𝛾 or if 
𝛼 = 0 holds. Or, for (ii) 𝛽 < 0 the inter-temporal budget constraint of the government is not 
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fulfilled except for 𝐵(0) = 𝑌(0)𝛼/(𝑟 − 𝛾 − 𝛽) and 𝑟 > 𝛾. To prove this, the expression  
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝐵(𝑡) is written as follows: 
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝐵(𝑡) = (
𝛼
𝑟−𝛾−𝛽
) 𝑌(0)𝑒(𝛾−𝑟)𝑡 + 𝑒−𝛽𝑡𝐶1                                                      (11)  
It must be noted that both terms on the r.h.s. of eq. (11), 𝑒−𝛽𝑡𝐶2, converges to zero  for t → ∞ 
if 𝑟 > 𝛾 holds. For 𝛼 = 0 the first term equals zero independent of r and 𝛾. Thus, (i) is 
proven. It should be noted that for 𝛽 > 0, 𝑟 < 𝛾 and 𝛼 < (>)0 the first term converges to +(-
)∞ for t → ∞. However, we exclude the case where debt converges to t− ∞ by assumption. 
To prove (ii), we note that the first term on the r.h.s. of eq. (12) converges to zero if 𝑟 > 𝛾 
holds. The second term on the r.h.s. of eq. (12), 𝑒−𝛽𝑡𝐶1 equals zero if 𝐶1 = 0 holds, which is 
equivalent to  
𝐵(0) = 𝑌(0)𝛼/(𝑟 − 𝛾 − 𝛽). If these conditions do not hold simultaneously, 𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝐵(𝑡) 
diverges either to +∞ or to -∞. This proposition shows that as long as economies are 
dynamically efficient, 𝛽 > 0 guarantees that the discounted public debt converges to zero 
and, therefore, is a sufficient condition for the sustainability of a given fiscal policy. It should 
also be noted that sustainability may be realised even if the debt ratio is not constant, at least 
transitorily. In dynamically inefficient economies where 𝑟 < 𝛾holds, the present value of 
government debt may explode and the inter-temporal budget constraint will not be fulfilled 
even with 𝛽 > 0.  
However, it must be pointed out that in such economies the inter-temporal budget constraint 
is irrelevant. This holds true because in dynamically inefficient economies, the government 
can issue debt and roll it over indefinitely and cover interest payments by new debt issues, i.e. 
the government can indeed play a Ponzi game. Finally, the inter-temporal budget constraint is 
not fulfilled if the government reduces its primary surplus as the debt ratio rises, i.e. for β < 
0, except for the hairline case,𝐵(0) = 𝑌(0)𝛼/(𝑟 − 𝛾 − 𝛽). It must also be pointed out that in 
a stochastic economy, dynamic efficiency does not necessarily imply that the interest rate on 
government debt exceeds the growth rate of the economy, i.e. γ > r may occur. This holds 
true because with risky assets, the interest rate on safe government bonds can be lower than 
the marginal product of capital. If the stochastic economy is dynamically efficient and the 
growth rate exceeds the interest rate on government bonds, a positive β is nevertheless also 
sufficient for the inter-temporal budget constraint to be fulfilled if α = 0 holds. A formal 
proof of this assertion is demonstrated by Bohn (1998) and Canzonerie et al. (2001). 
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These theoretical considerations demonstrate that in a deterministic economy, an increase in 
the primary surplus to GDP ratio is as a consequence of a rise in the debt to GDP ratio, 
whereas the inter-temporal budget constraint of the government is achievable in dynamically 
efficient economies. Bohn’s fiscal rule is based on the tax smoothing model of Barro (1979). 
And is made in a way where in the long-term equilibrium relation formula among variables, 
cyclical variation of economy, and trend break of government expenditure are added to 
regression formula. Based on the fact that when national debt increases, the stability of debt 
is only secured by corrective actions of fiscal balance, Bohn (1998) suggests a regression 
equation as follows: 
 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝑏𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝑍𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                (12)  
 
where 𝑍𝑡 includes several variables that determine fiscal balance.  
Variables contained in 𝑍𝑡 include temporary government spending (GVAR) – whose usability 
has been verified by Barro (1986) – and business cycle indicator (YVAR). This is to control 
the impact of changes in fiscal expenditure on fiscal balances. For fiscal stability, 
government’s primary balance and its debt should be related such that increase in debts 
should be accompanied by increase in fiscal surpluses, implying that 𝛿 needs to show a 
positive sign. As has been mentioned previously, the analysis presented here is based on the 
tax smoothing hypothesis. This means that the primary deficit is supposed to help smoothen 
out revenues and expenditure variations. This is to ensure and maintain a steady and even tax 
rate. The non-debt determinants of the primary surplus are thus the level of temporary 
government spending (GVAR), and the business cycle indicator (YVAR). Also, as mentioned 
in the literature review, new macro-variables, are introduced into the model in the African 
context. These are foreign direct investments (FDI) and remittances both of which have a 
positive relationship with the primary surplus ratio. The model for the primary surplus to 
GDP ratio to is: 
𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛿𝑏𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡        (13)  
with 𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑡/𝑌𝑡, foreign direct investment to GDP ratio, 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑡 = 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑡/𝑌𝑡 remittances 
to GDP ratio and 𝜀𝑡, error term which is assumed to be i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
).  
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We also assume that the lagged debt ratio 𝑏𝑡−1 affects the primary surplus ratio in order to 
account for causality.  
4.   Empirical analysis  
4.1. Data description and econometric techniques  
 
The data used in this study is taken from the International Financial Statistics, the database of 
the International Monetary Fund Economist Intelligence Unit, UNCTAD and World Bank 
annual database and covers the period from f 1970 to 2012. The ten countries under 
consideration are Algeria (ALG), Ivory Coast (CIV), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Nigeria 
(NIG), Rwanda (RWA), South Africa (SA), Tanzania (TZ), Tunisia (TUN) and Zambia 
(ZAM). This study solely focuses on a relatively small sample of ten developing countries.  
In this study, public debt is defined as the sum of the domestic debt and foreign debt. The 
estimation of 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡 and 𝑌𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡 requires potential or trend GDP and government 
expenditure. The trend GDP and government expenditure is estimated using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter, 𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
𝑔𝑡−𝑔𝑡
∗
𝑦𝑡
 and 𝑌𝑉𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
𝑦𝑡
∗−𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡
∗
𝑔𝑡
∗
𝑦𝑡
 where 𝑔𝑡
∗ and 𝑦𝑡
∗ are estimated trends 
through the H-P filter. On the basis of the findings of various studies (Greiner et al., 2007; 
Greiner and Kauermann, 2007; Fincke and Greiner, 2010), equation (13) will be regressed by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. Because Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can give 
biased standard errors and t-statistics due to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the 
residuals, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are calculated to get 
robust estimates (White, 1980; Newey and West, 1987). All estimations are done with 
EViews 7. 
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4.2.   Estimates results 
 
Table 7: Estimates for eq. (13) 
Country - Constant bt-1 GVARt YVARt remt fdit 
ALG Coefficient 
Std.error(t-stat) 
Pr(˃t) 
DW 
R2(adj) 
-0.015 
0.005(-2.783) 
0.003 
2.007 
0.739 
0.203 
0.026(7.345) 
0.007 
-5.287 
2.878(-2.054) 
0.047 
1.060 
1.709(6.253) 
0.002 
-7.437 
1.261(5.748) 
0.182 
-4.732 
0.563(-0.362) 
0.001 
CIV Coefficient 
Std.error(t-stat) 
Pr(˃t) 
DW 
R2(adj) 
-0.060 
0.014(-4.20) 
0.412 
1.578 
0.847 
0.156 
0.030(5.290) 
0.604 
-8.472 
0.061(-3.564) 
0.001 
1.830 
3.321(5.425) 
0.002 
-3.872 
0.934(1.832)  
0.004   
       
0.429 
1.673(-2.201) 
0.000 
GHA Coefficient 
Std.error(t-stat) 
Pr(˃t) 
DW 
R2(adj) 
-0.123 
0.035(-2.728) 
0.407 
2.289 
0.882 
0.843 
0.082(-8.321) 
0.003 
-1.231 
1.830(3.000) 
0.001 
-3.218 
0.920(0.263) 
0.008 
0.147  
0.222(-1.673) 
0.082                    
2.389 
0.011(-3.932) 
0.002 
 
 
KEN Coefficient 
Std.error(t-stat) 
Pr(˃t) 
DW 
R2(adj) 
-0.372 
0.435(-2.322) 
0.001 
2.053 
0.704 
1.982 
0.043(2.381) 
0.288 
0.983 
0.261(1.382) 
0.003 
0.321 
0.330(-1.321) 
0.007 
2.982 
0.421(2.921) 
0.004 
-3.281 
2.732(-219) 
0.083 
NIG Coefficient 
Std.error(t-stat) 
Pr(˃t) 
DW 
R(adj)2 
-0.045 
0.030(-1.702) 
0.035 
2.887 
0.834 
0.011 
0.832(0.203) 
0.577 
-1.290 
1.983(0.281) 
0.004 
-3.367 
0.201(0.055) 
0.002 
0.420 
0.320(-0.068) 
0.782 
2.192 
0.627(-2.333) 
0.277 
RWA Coefficient 
Std.error(t-stat) 
Pr(˃t) 
DW 
R2(adj) 
-0.110 
0.016(-6.291) 
0.013 
1.953 
0.902 
0.173 
0.055(3.333) 
0.001 
-0.198 
0.026(-6.129) 
0.080 
0.280 
0.050(4.892) 
0.010 
0.382 
0.290(-2.982) 
0.001 
1.392 
0.302(-2.832) 
0.053 
SA Coefficient 
Std.error(t-stat) 
Pr(˃t) 
DW 
R2(adj) 
-0.991 
0.210(-2.290) 
0.002 
2.381 
0.882 
1.120 
0.027(-1.072) 
0.004 
-5.77 
0.025(2.192) 
0.007 
1.003 
0.055(3.219) 
0.011 
-0.562 
0.102(-0.932) 
0.067 
3.923 
0.014(-1.402) 
0.002 
TUN Coefficient 
Std.error(t-stat) 
Pr(˃t) 
DW 
R2(adj) 
-0.022 
0.041(-2.001) 
0.008 
2.289 
0.631 
-1.009 
0.051(0.008) 
0.749 
-1.719 
0.065(-2.193) 
0.008 
0.231 
0.108(3.333) 
0.004 
-1.932 
0.102(-3.912)  
0.003                     
0.738 
0.020(-0.822) 
0.001 
TZ Coefficient 
Std.error(t-stat) 
Pr(˃t) 
DW 
R2(adj) 
0.023 
0.029(1.822) 
0.003 
1.924 
0.688 
-0.431 
0.034(-3.291) 
0.047 
-1.321 
0.077(-0.290) 
0.071 
-3.064 
0.071(-6.892) 
0.006 
3.201 
0.033(-4.420) 
0.004         
0.382 
0.066(2.013) 
0.021 
ZAM Coefficient 
Std.error(t-stat) 
Pr(˃t) 
DW 
R2(adj) 
-0.672 
0.020(-0.389) 
0.008 
2.280 
0.744 
-3.881 
0.097(1.923) 
0.111 
2.821 
0.043(3.314) 
0.023 
0.070 
0.0720(1.477) 
0.100 
1.920 
0.007(-1.923) 
0.031 
0.992 
0.048(0.761) 
0.002 
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As shown in Table 1, Algeria’s coefficient for the debt ratio is positive and highly significant 
at 5% level (t-statistic=7.345). The coefficient of business cycle variables is positive and 
significant at 5%, which indicates that the primary surplus ratio increases when the real GDP 
is above its normal values. GVARt has an expected negative sign. Other variables, fdit and 
remt have negative coefficients and only foreign direct investment is significant. The Durbin-
Watson test statistic is 2.0, which does not show correlations of the residuals. Further, the R
2
 
(adj) = 0.739 gives a fair goodness of fit. The results for Cote d’Ivoire show that the 
coefficient for the debt ratio is positive as expected and not significant, and GVARt, YVARt, 
fdit and remt are all significant at 1%. But GVARt and remt show negative signs. The Durbin-
Watson statistic is 1.5, there is no correlation in residuals and R
2
 (adj) = 0.847 is high enough.  
 
Ghana’s results show that the coefficient for the debt ratio is positive and significant. GVARt 
and YVARt have negative signs and are significant. fdit and remt are  positive  and significant 
at 1%, which means that they increase the primary surplus when remittances and foreign 
direct investment grow in value. Also, it is D-W statistic is 2.2 and shows no correlation in 
residuals and the good fit of the model is displayed by a high R
2
 (adj) = 0.8821. The results 
for Kenya show a positive coefficient for the debt ratio, but are not significant at any level. 
Other variables also show positive signs, except foreign direct investment which is negative; 
both are significant at respectively 1% and 10%. This is true for a country that remittance 
flows constitute more than 20% of GDP. Also, D-W statistics show that residuals are not 
correlated and the goodness of fit is given by R
2
 (adj) = 0.704. The results for Nigeria show a 
positive coefficient of debt ratio but not significant at all the usual levels. The coefficients for 
business cycle and expenditure variables are negative but significant. The remittances and 
FDI variables are both positive but not significant. The goodness of fit R
2
 (adj) = 0.834 is 
relatively high and there seems to be no correlation of the residuals according to the Durbin-
Watson test statistic (DW= 2.8).  
 
The results for Rwanda show that the coefficient of debt ratio is positive and significant at the 
1% level. All other coefficients are significant as well. The ones for the expenditure variable 
and the business cycle show the expected negative and positive signs respectively. R
2
(adj) = 
0.902 gives a high goodness of fit for the model. There is no correlation of the residuals as 
DW= 1.9. With regard to South Africa’s results, as shown in Table1, the coefficient of debt 
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ratio is positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient for public spending is 
negative as well whereas the one for the business cycle variable shows a positive sign, both 
being statistically significant. The effect of a rise in the spending parameter indicates a 
decline in the primary surplus ratio and an economic boom affects an increase in primary 
surplus to GDP ratio. R
2
 (adj) = 0.882 gives a high goodness of fit for the model. There are 
no correlations of the residuals as DW= 2.3. Also the variables fdit and remt are significant 
and have different signs.  
 
Tunisia’s economy also shows a positive coefficient for the debt ratio but it is not significant 
at any usual level. Other coefficients are significant and have expected signs except fdit and 
remt. The model for Tanzania shows a negative coefficient for the debt ratio; however, it is 
significant at the level of 5%. The estimated expenditure has an expected sign and is 
significant,  implying that public spending above its normal value reduces the primary surplus 
ratio,while the business cycle variable has a negative sign but significant. The variables fdit 
and remt are both positive and significant. DW= 1.9 shows there is no correlation in the 
residuals and R
2
 (adj) = 0.688. The results for Zambia also show a negative coefficient for the 
debt ratio and not significant. Other variables are both positive and significant with DW 
statistic that shows there is no correlation in the residuals and R
2
 (adj) = 0.744 which gives a 
good fit for the model. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has estimated fiscal reaction functions for African economies using Bohn’s 
fiscal rule that tests how primary surpluses react to variations in the public debt to GDP ratio. 
It has also introduced new macro-variables to the model that may reduce or sustain public 
debt in the African context. This function shows that the response of primary surplus to GDP 
ratios seems to increase with rising public debt to GDP ratios in some countries in line with 
Bohn’s theory. According to the results, Algeria, Ghana, Rwanda and South Africa all have 
sustainable debt policies in place. The results of both tests show that Algeria, Ghana and 
South Africa clearly follow a sustainable debt policy and those countries can be considered as 
the examples as concerns their debt policy. As regards Rwanda, sustainability of fiscal policy 
seems to be given although the country is characterised by a growing debt ratio. This 
conclusion is based on a positive and statistically significant reaction of the primary surplus 
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to variations in public debt and on stationary public deficits. However, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya 
and Nigeria, debt ratio coefficients are positive but not statistically significant while Tunisia, 
Tanzania and Zambia have negative coefficients of debt ratio. Ficke and Greiner (2010) 
confirm the results for Rwanda and Tunisia. 
With other variables of the model, foreign direct investment (fdit) and remittances (remt) 
show different reactions in different economies. In Cote d’Ivoire, FDI is positive and highly 
significant. In Kenya, only remittances are positive and significant. Countries like Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Zambia have positive coefficients for FDI and remittances both of which are 
significant. South Africa and Tunisia show a positive sign for the FDI variable that is 
statistically significant. It is suggested that countries with negative coefficients of debt ratio 
that are not statistically significant at any usual level should make more effort towards 
stabilising public debt.  
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